Ethical Hacking News
A new phase of cyber deception has emerged, with fake DocuSign and Gitcode sites spreading NetSupport RAT via a multi-stage PowerShell attack. Experts warn that the attackers' use of CAPTCHA verifications and legitimate services highlights the evolving nature of cyber deception. Stay informed and take precautions to protect yourself against such threats.
Malicious actors are spreading NetSupport RAT malware through fake websites masquerading as legitimate services. The fake websites impersonate popular services like Gitcode and DocuSign to trick users into executing malicious PowerShell scripts. The attackers use a multi-stage approach to infect machines, making it difficult for security investigators to detect and dismantle the operation. The campaign uses ClickFix-style CAPTCHA verifications to dupe victims into running the malicious script. The script downloads multiple payloads, including a persistence script that ensures the payload is launched automatically when the user logs in. Experts warn that the use of legitimate services like Gitcode and DocuSign by attackers highlights the evolving nature of cyber deception.
Malicious actors have evolved their tactics to spread a notorious remote access trojan (RAT) malware, NetSupport RAT, through fake websites masquerading as legitimate services. According to DomainTools Investigations (DTI), the company behind this malicious campaign has employed deceptive websites to trick unsuspecting users into executing malicious PowerShell scripts on their machines and ultimately infecting them with the NetSupport RAT.
The fake websites in question have been identified as spoofed versions of Gitcode and DocuSign, two popular services used by individuals and businesses alike. These counterfeit sites are designed to deceive users into copying and running an initial PowerShell script on their Windows Run command. Upon doing so, the script downloads another downloader script and executes on the system, which in turn retrieves additional payloads and executes them eventually installing NetSupport RAT on the infected machines.
The attackers have utilized a multi-stage approach to achieve this goal, making it increasingly difficult for security investigators to detect and dismantle the operation. The PowerShell scripts present hosted on the fake Gitcode sites are designed to download a series of intermediate PowerShell scripts from an external server ("tradingviewtool[.]com") that are used in succession to launch NetSupport RAT on victim machines.
One notable aspect of this campaign is the use of ClickFix-style CAPTCHA verifications to dupe victims into running the malicious PowerShell script. Triggering the CAPTCHA verification causes an obfuscated PowerShell command to be clandestinely copied to the user's clipboard — a technique known as clipboard poisoning — after which they are instructed to launch the Windows Run dialog ("Win + R"), paste ("CTRL + V"), and press Enter, causing the script to be executed in the process.
The PowerShell script works by downloading a persistence script ("wbdims.exe") from GitHub to ensure that the payload is launched automatically when the user logs in to the system. While this payload was no longer available during the time of investigation, the expectation is that it checks in with the delivery site via 'docusign.sa[.]com/verification/c.php,' resulting in a refresh in the browser for the page to display the content of 'docusign.sa[.]com/verification/s.php?an=1.'
This refresh ultimately leads to the delivery of a second-stage PowerShell script, which then downloads and executes a third-stage ZIP payload from the same server by setting the URL parameter "an" to "2." The script proceeds to unpack the archive and run an executable named "jp2launcher.exe" present within it, ultimately leading to the deployment of NetSupport RAT.
The techniques employed by these malicious actors are commonplace and have been previously documented in other attacks. However, this campaign is notable for its complexity and the use of CAPTCHA verifications to evade detection. As DomainTools pointed out, similar delivery URL, domain naming, and registration patterns were identified in connection with a SocGholish (aka FakeUpdates) campaign detected in October 2024.
While it remains unclear who is behind this campaign, experts emphasize that the multiple stages of scripts downloading and running scripts that download and run yet more scripts are likely an attempt to evade detection and be more resilient to security investigations and takedowns.
The use of legitimate services like Gitcode and DocuSign by attackers highlights the evolving nature of cyber deception. As users become increasingly reliant on these services, attackers are leveraging this trust to their advantage.
It is essential for users to remain vigilant and take precautions against such attacks. This includes verifying the authenticity of websites before providing sensitive information or executing scripts, as well as keeping software and systems up-to-date with the latest security patches.
In conclusion, this malicious campaign serves as a reminder of the ongoing cat-and-mouse game between attackers and defenders in the realm of cybersecurity. As attackers adapt and evolve their tactics, it is crucial for users and organizations to stay informed and take proactive measures to protect themselves against such threats.
Related Information:
https://www.ethicalhackingnews.com/articles/A-New-Phase-of-Cyber-Deception-Fake-DocuSign-and-Gitcode-Sites-Spread-NetSupport-RAT-via-Multi-Stage-PowerShell-Attack-ehn.shtml
https://thehackernews.com/2025/06/fake-docusign-gitcode-sites-spread.html
https://www.area51net.com/HOME/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/5238904/Fake-DocuSign-Gitcode-Sites-Spread-NetSupport-RAT-via-Multi-Stage-PowerShell-Attack
https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/understanding-the-clickfix-attack/
https://www.techopedia.com/clickfix-malware-tiktok-scams-exposed
https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124/
https://blog.sucuri.net/2024/06/socgholish-malware.html
Published: Tue Jun 3 11:27:47 2025 by llama3.2 3B Q4_K_M