Ethical Hacking News
A Train Derailment Waiting to Happen: The US Railroad Industry's Vulnerability to Remote Control
The US railroad industry is vulnerable to remote control of its trains due to an outdated communication protocol. Despite a CISA warning, the industry has yet to implement new security measures, leaving freight operators at risk.
The US railroad industry is plagued by outdated technology, with a recent vulnerability discovered by security researcher Neil Smith highlighting the severity of this issue. A software-defined radio can potentially disrupt a train's brakes remotely, allowing an attacker to stop or shut down the entire national railway system. The FRED protocol used by trains is vulnerable to spoofing using software-defined radios due to weak authentication, which has been addressed with CVE-2025-1727 by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The Association of American Railroads (AAR) claims it is working on a new, more secure technology, but its implementation is not expected until at least 2027. The lack of urgency from regulatory bodies and industry stakeholders is troubling, given the potential consequences of an attack, including derailments or shutting down the national railway system. The vulnerability was initially reported in 2012 by Smith but fell through the cracks until CISA issued a warning nearly three years later. Freight operators are taking steps to segment their networks and perform basic cybersecurity maintenance, but it is unlikely to stop an attacker with access to software-defined radio technology.
The US railroad industry has long been plagued by outdated technology, and a recent vulnerability discovered by security researcher Neil Smith highlights just how serious this issue is. A software-defined radio can potentially disrupt the train's brakes remotely, allowing an attacker to stop the train in its tracks or even shut down the entire national railway system.
According to Smith, who first reported his findings to the US government in 2012, the vulnerability lies in a communication protocol used by trains, known as FRED (for Flashing Rear-End Device). This protocol uses an old BCH checksum to create packets that can be easily spoofed using software-defined radios. This means that if someone had access to such technology, they could potentially take control of a train's brakes from a distance.
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has since issued CVE-2025-1727, specifying the issue as one of weak authentication in the FRED protocol. However, despite this warning, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), a trade group representing the freight rail industry, claims that it is currently looking to implement a newer, more secure technology for freight trains. Unfortunately, as Smith pointed out in a long thread on X, this replacement technology is not expected to arrive until at least 2027.
The lack of urgency from AAR and other regulatory bodies is troubling, given the potential consequences of such an attack. According to Smith, if someone were able to remotely take control over a train's brake controller from a distance, they could induce brake failure leading to derailments or even shut down the entire national railway system. While it is impossible to predict with certainty how such an attack would play out in real-world terms, the risks are certainly high.
So, how did this vulnerability take so long to be addressed? According to Smith, the problem began when he first discovered it in 2012 and reported his findings to ICS-CERT (the US Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team). Despite follow-up efforts by Smith and other researchers, including security researcher Eric Reuter, who independently discovered the same issue at DEFCON in 2018, the matter seemed to fall through the cracks.
It wasn't until CISA issued CVE-2025-1727 that AAR finally took notice. However, even then, the response was slow, and it is only now, nearly three years after the initial warning, that AAR has committed to implementing a new technology as a replacement for the outdated FRED protocol.
In the meantime, freight operators are left to segment their networks to isolate critical controls and perform other basic cybersecurity maintenance. While this may provide some peace of mind, it is unlikely to stop an attacker with access to software-defined radio technology from derailing a train if they are determined to do so.
The lack of urgency and coordination in addressing this vulnerability is a concerning trend in the US railroad industry. As Smith pointed out, "you could remotely take control over a train's brake controller from a very long distance." This raises serious questions about the ability of regulatory bodies and industry stakeholders to work together to address such vulnerabilities before they become major issues.
In conclusion, the US railroad industry's vulnerability to remote control is a pressing concern that requires immediate attention. The lack of urgency and coordination in addressing this issue is troubling, given the potential consequences of such an attack. While it may take time for new technologies to be implemented and tested, regulatory bodies and industry stakeholders must work together to ensure that such vulnerabilities are addressed before they become major issues.
Related Information:
https://www.ethicalhackingnews.com/articles/A-Train-Derailment-Waiting-to-Happen-The-US-Railroad-Industrys-Vulnerability-to-Remote-Control-ehn.shtml
https://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.com/2025/07/14/train_brakes_flaw/
Published: Mon Jul 14 12:56:24 2025 by llama3.2 3B Q4_K_M
