Ethical Hacking News
A new MitM attack has been discovered that exploits vulnerabilities in modern Wi-Fi networks, allowing attackers to steal sensitive data and bypass client isolation. Experts warn of the importance of proper VLAN management and recommend using strong key-based encryption/authentication at Level 1 of the network stack to prevent similar attacks.
AirSnitch is a novel attack method that exploits vulnerabilities in modern Wi-Fi networks, allowing attackers to intercept and manipulate sensitive data. The attack targets Layers 1 and 2 of the Wi-Fi network, making it possible for attackers to bypass client isolation and implement full relay attacks. Proper VLAN management is crucial in preventing this attack, as guest devices on the same subnet can be vulnerable to spoofing at layers 1 and 2. Experts recommend exercising measured caution when using unmanaged or unfamiliar Wi-Fi networks, and using trustworthy VPNs on public APs or tethering a connection from a cell phone.
AirSnitch, a novel attack method discovered by researchers Zhou et al., has shed light on the vulnerabilities of modern Wi-Fi networks, allowing attackers to intercept and manipulate sensitive data transmitted between devices. The discovery of this attack highlights the ongoing struggle to secure wireless communication in today's digital age.
According to the context data provided, AirSnitch exploits the fact that many company intranets are sent in plaintext, making them susceptible to interception by an attacker. The attacker can view and modify all traffic in the clear, stealing authentication cookies, passwords, payment card details, and other sensitive information. Even with HTTPS in place, the attacker can still intercept domain look-up traffic and use DNS cache poisoning to corrupt tables stored by the target's operating system.
The AirSnitch MitM attack targets Layers 1 and 2 of the Wi-Fi network, interacting between them. The first half of the attack involves port stealing, a technique adapted from early Ethernet attacks, where the attacker spoofs the victim's MAC address on another NIC to associate it with their own port/BSSID. This allows the internal switch to forward frames intended for the victim to the attacker, who then encrypts them using their own Public Transmission Key (PTK).
To complete the bidirectional attack, the attacker restores the original MAC > port mapping by sending a Group Temporal Key-wrapped ICMP ping from a random MAC. This step enables the attack to see the external IP addresses hosting webpages being visited and correlates them with precise URLs.
The AirSnitch MitM has significant implications for network security, as it allows attackers to bypass client isolation and implement full relay attacks against other clients. This restoration of the original mapping also enables the attacker to wage attacks against vulnerabilities that may not be patched.
Experts caution that proper VLAN management is crucial in preventing this attack, as guest devices on the same subnet can be vulnerable to spoofing at layers 1 and 2. Researchers Zhou et al.'s work highlights the need for modern Wi-Fi replacement/updated versions with strong key-based encryption/authentication at Level 1 of the network stack.
In response to the discovery of AirSnitch, security experts advise exercising measured caution when using unmanaged or unfamiliar Wi-Fi networks, and recommend using trustworthy VPNs on public APs or tethering a connection from a cell phone. The vulnerability exposed by this attack underscores the ongoing need for vigilance in protecting sensitive information transmitted over wireless networks.
Related Information:
https://www.ethicalhackingnews.com/articles/AirSnitch-A-New-MitM-Attack-Exploits-Wi-Fi-Vulnerabilities-to-Steal-Sensitive-Data-ehn.shtml
https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/02/new-airsnitch-attack-breaks-wi-fi-encryption-in-homes-offices-and-enterprises/
https://ccstartup.com/blog/2026/02/26/new-airsnitch-attack-breaks-wi-fi-encryption-in-homes-offices-and-enterprises/
Published: Fri Feb 27 01:52:39 2026 by llama3.2 3B Q4_K_M
