Ethical Hacking News
Suspected Russian Hackers Abuse Google OAuth and WhatsApp Linking to Hijack Accounts
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified three Russian cyber espionage threat clusters using legitimate authentication flows to target individuals in academia, aerospace, defense, and government. Three distinct threat clusters have been identified: UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976, with UNC6293 being a sub-cluster of Ice Relic (formerly APT29). Threat actors use phishing campaigns, OAuth phishing, and application-specific passwords to compromise personal accounts across multiple platforms. UNC5976 uses cloud infrastructure to automate token collection and abuse OAuth phishing techniques. UNC7005 uses a rogue Excel plugin called HEADRUSH to deliver an HTML Application (HTA) downloaded, targeting Ukrainian aerospace and imaging companies. The threat actors engage in device code phishing operations targeting Microsoft and WhatsApp accounts, with wine-related lures being a recurring theme in Ice Relic attacks. The threat actors use a centralized C2 panel called FruitStone to manage their operations and evade detection.
The threat landscape continues to evolve with new and sophisticated cyber-attacks. Recently, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified three distinct suspected Russian cyber espionage threat clusters that have been observed leveraging legitimate authentication flows to single out individuals working in academia, aerospace and defense, governments, and think tanks across Europe, as well as academia and think tanks within the U.S. These clusters include UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976. The first of these clusters, UNC6293, is assessed to be a sub-cluster of Ice Relic (formerly APT29), which is also tracked under the monikers Cozy Bear and Midnight Blizzard. The hacking crew was previously attributed to a campaign that abused a Google account feature called application specific passwords to seize control of victim accounts.
Since then, the threat actor has continued to engage in phishing campaigns that tend to be small in scope, targeting fewer than five users at a time, while impersonating State Department officials to perform app password phishing. The application names and lures revolve around diplomatic themes and upcoming conferences or meetings, some of which were highlighted by Volexity in December 2025. As recently as June 2026, Google said it observed the threat actor conducting OAuth phishing by requesting targets to share either the full URL or verification code after performing a legitimate login to an external provider. Once the requested verification code is provided, it allows the attackers to access the target's account.
The second threat group with an authentication focus, UNC5976, has been found to use OAuth phishing techniques and automate the collection of tokens by abusing cloud infrastructure. The adversary is believed to be active since at least March 2026. To perform these OAuth phishing campaigns, UNC5976 purchased domains, usually using file-sharing-related domain names, and then created a cloud project related to that domain. These domains host a fake file-sharing page. After a target visits the page for a few seconds, the page displays a pop-up login dialog. The pop-up features a "Continue with Google" button that, if clicked, redirects the victim to the legitimate Google OAuth login page, asking them to sign in to continue. Upon successful authentication, the victim is sent to a Google Cloud project URL that hosts malicious scripts designed to retrieve the authentication token from the URL and stage it for later use.
The third cluster, UNC7005, has been observed leveraging a rogue Excel plugin codenamed HEADRUSH that's used to deliver an HTML Application (HTA) downloaded. The malware, discovered in April 2026, is distributed via a fake domain impersonating a Ukrainian research institute. There are indications that the artifact may have been used to target a Ukrainian aerospace and imaging company, although the full scope of the infection remains unknown. UNC7005 is also said to have augmented its tradecraft with commodity infostealers like Vidar and Atomic (aka AMOS) to siphon data from Windows and macOS hosts to target U.S.-based academics, diplomats, and researchers focused on Russia and former Soviet states with pushing emails containing links to malicious URLs.
Both UNC6293 and UNC7005 are believed to be related to a sub-group within Ice Relic that's focused on initial access operations, while relying on commercial residential proxies for post-compromise activity. Like UNC6293, UNC7005 has conducted highly selective app password phishing operations aimed at individuals of interest to the Kremlin. The hacking group has also engaged in device code phishing operations targeting both Microsoft and WhatsApp accounts, with the former making use of phishing emails containing invitations to diplomatic events and conferences. The messages embed a link to an attacker-controlled site, which profiles the site visitor and then prompts them to confirm their participation in the event and state their main course and wine preferences.
Furthermore, the use of wine-related lures has been a recurring theme in Ice Relic attacks dating back to April 2023. Some aspects of the activity were codenamed SPIKEDWINE by Zscaler. In May and June 2026, UNC7005 conducted social engineering operations spoofing WhatsApp. The phishing pages distributed by the attacker lure targets into linking their WhatsApp accounts with an attacker-controlled device in order to join a secure WhatsApp call, chat, or document share. The attacker also attempts multiple other methods of compromise after the device is linked.
Once the page is accessed, the target is asked to provide a phone number. The number is then used to create a legitimate WhatsApp device link request with the attacker device, after which it displays the legitimate QR and linking code to the target along with instructions to the user to link their device. After the target's account is successfully linked to the attacker's WhatsApp device, the phishing page serves an additional prompt to the user to either join a voice call, encrypted chat, or download a file. If the victim ends up joining the voice call, it triggers the execution of JavaScript to record their audio and video, and send the recording to a command-and-control (C2) endpoint.
Should the encrypted chat option be chosen, the JavaScript prompts the target to copy the username and password presented to them to log in on a secondary URL. The exact nature of the file download remains unknown. Around May 2026, UNC7005 is also said to have augmented its tradecraft with commodity infostealers like Vidar and Atomic (aka AMOS) to siphon data from Windows and macOS hosts to target U.S.-based academics, diplomats, and researchers focused on Russia and former Soviet states with pushing emails containing links to malicious URLs. The entire operation is managed by means of a centralized, web-based C2 panel known as FruitStone. It's branded as "CloudSync Console" and associated with "Acuity Systems, Inc.," likely in an attempt to appear as legitimate cloud management software to escape detection.
It's worth noting that the use of wine-related lures has been a recurring theme in Ice Relic attacks dating back to April 2023. Some aspects of the activity were codenamed SPIKEDWINE by Zscaler. Furthermore, Lumen Black Lotus Labs ongoing tracking of the same campaign has raised the possibility that the threat actor compromised several Managed Service Providers (MSPs), then abused the trust relationship with their clients in a supply chain attack. The threat actor is estimated to have created no less than 12 new domains and related infrastructure since March 2026, all of which have since been disrupted by Google. The actions are said to have prompted UNC5976 to pivot away from Google infrastructure to other providers to host their phishing pages.
"These clusters engage in persistent, adaptive phishing campaigns, using sophisticated social engineering tactics to compromise personal accounts across multiple platforms," Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) researchers Gabby Roncone and Wesley Shields said in a report published today. "In particular, their creative abuse of legitimate features to compromise accounts makes tracking legitimate and malicious account access more challenging." "The combination of these tactics not only enables the attacker to conduct quick-turnaround exfiltration operations, but also presents opportunities for the attacker to further phish targets of interest from compromised, legitimate accounts."
Related Information:
https://www.ethicalhackingnews.com/articles/Suspected-Russian-Hackers-Abuse-Google-OAuth-and-WhatsApp-Linking-to-Hijack-Accounts-ehn.shtml
https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/suspected-russian-hackers-abuse-google.html
Published: Thu Aug 20 17:57:11 2026 by llama3.2 3B Q4_K_M
