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As the world grapples with the absence of nuclear treaties, researchers are exploring innovative ways to monitor and verify compliance using satellite technology and artificial intelligence. Can this new approach fill the gap left by expired agreements? The answer lies in understanding the complexities and challenges involved in leveraging AI for arms control verification.
Researchers propose using satellite technology and artificial intelligence (AI) to monitor and verify compliance with potential new nuclear arms control agreements. The approach, called "cooperative technical means," relies on AI systems verified by humans to watch over nuclear locations without requiring on-site inspections. The system would use large datasets specific to each country's nuclear capabilities to detect minute changes and potentially identify individual weapon systems. Concerns include the need for substantial datasets, inherent stochasticity in AI systems, and a lack of clear guidelines for their use in arms control verification. The proposal aims to fill a critical gap in nuclear arms control, providing an additional layer of security between intrusive on-site inspections and no agreements at all.
In a world where decades of trust-building efforts through on-site inspections have come to an end, researchers and scientists are proposing a bold new approach to nuclear arms control. In the absence of the last major treaty between the US and Russia, which expired in February 2026, experts are turning to satellite technology and artificial intelligence (AI) as a means to monitor and verify compliance with potential new agreements.
At the forefront of this initiative is Matt Korda, an associate director at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), who has penned a report outlining a possible future for arms control in a world where all the old treaties have died. In "Inspections Without Inspectors," Korda and co-author Igor Morić describe a new way to monitor the world's nuclear weapons they call "cooperative technical means." This approach relies on a web of existing satellites to monitor intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, mobile rocket launchers, and plutonium pit production sites.
The idea is to use AI systems, verified by humans, to watch over these locations. The AI would be trained on large datasets specific to each country's nuclear capabilities, allowing it to identify minute changes at particular locations and potentially detect individual weapon systems. This system would not require anyone on-site, nor would it necessitate persistent spying-style coverage.
Korda acknowledges that this approach is imperfect, as competent AI systems need substantial datasets to be effective. "You have to build these bespoke datasets for each country," he notes. These datasets would contain detailed information about how each country builds ICBM silos and other nuclear infrastructure. However, even within countries, there can be differences in the way they construct their nuclear capabilities.
Another concern is that AI systems are complex entities with inherent stochasticity. According to Sara Al-Sayed of the Union of Concerned Scientists, this means that even the process of curating data for training an AI model introduces randomness and uncertainty. "The stochasticity of these techniques, starting from the process of curating the data, then the labeling, and then the model itself, and the random performance of that model and its lack of explainability," Al-Sayed emphasizes.
Furthermore, there is a pressing need to establish clear guidelines for how AI systems would be used in arms control verification. Without this foundation, it would be challenging for countries to agree on the specifics of an AI-based regime. In essence, if reliance on automation becomes necessary for effective verification, then negotiations over these agreements would become increasingly difficult.
Despite these challenges, Korda remains optimistic about the potential for satellite technology and AI to fill a critical gap in nuclear arms control. His proposal represents a middle ground between no arms control at all and intrusive on-site inspections, which may be politically unviable in today's environment. By leveraging existing satellites and AI systems, it is possible to create a remotely enforced treaty regime that could provide an additional layer of security.
In the end, the success of this approach will depend on countries' willingness to cooperate with one another to establish new agreements. While there are concerns about the potential for AI systems to introduce randomness into arms control verification, Korda and Morić's proposal represents a tangible step toward creating a more robust and effective system.
Related Information:
https://www.ethicalhackingnews.com/articles/The-Emergence-of-a-New-Era-in-Arms-Control-Leveraging-Satellite-Technology-and-Artificial-Intelligence-ehn.shtml
https://www.wired.com/story/satellites-ai-nuclear-treaties/
https://us.headtopics.com/news/ai-is-here-to-replace-nuclear-treaties-scared-yet-79516136
Published: Wed Feb 18 07:25:35 2026 by llama3.2 3B Q4_K_M
